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Affirming the Ban on Harsh Interrogation
MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL*
Beginning in 2002, lawyers for the Bush Administration began producing
the now infamous legal memoranda on the subject of interrogation. The

memoranda advise interrogatorsthat they can torture people without fear
of prosecution in connection with the so-called "global war on terror."
Much has been and will be written about the expedient and erroneous legal
analysis of the memos. One issue at risk of being overlooked, however,
because the memos emphasize torture, is that the UnitedStates must respect
limits far short of torture in conducting interrogations. The United States
may not use any form of coercion against persons detained in an armed
conflict, nor may it engage in cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment at
any time. The great effort of the memo writers to restricttorture to the most
extreme conduct imaginable obscures the fact that the United States has
wider obligations. Avoiding torture is not enough. Interrogatorsmust also
respect the broaderrestrictionson coercive, cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment.
The ban on coercive interrogation has both moral and pragmatic
underpinnings. Despite this, apparently some in the Bush Administration
have become persuaded that torture, coercion, cruelty, and abuse can be
effective methods of interrogation and that the need for information
outweighs the illegality and immorality of using such means. The weight of
the evidence, however, is firmly against that position. Forceful
interrogation is not as reliable as non-forceful means. The use of such
means has likely cost the United States lives. Ithas begun to involve the
United States in litigation aroundthe world, and it has dealt the nation's
reputation a blow from which it may take us decades to recover.

The infamous legal memoranda prepared by Bush Administration
lawyers following the events of September 11, 2001, go to great lengths to
free American officials from any possible legal restraint in the
Administration's so-called "global war on terror." 1 With regard to

* Copyright, Mary Ellen O'Connell, 2005. Robert and Marion Short Chair in Law,
Notre Dame Law School. With thanks for research assistance to Ohio State University
students Caoilte Joy, JD ('05), Gretchen Drenski, JD ( expected '06), and Benjamin Hill,
JD (expected '06) and for very helpful comments from colleagues Paolo Carozza, Joshua
Dressier, John Quigley, and Marc Spindelman. I also benefited from the remarks of
participants Henry T. King, Jr., William M. Hannay, Lee Casey, Philip B. Heymann, and
Marcy S. Strauss at the October 28, 2004, Ohio State Law Journal symposium: "Law and
Interrogation in War and Peace."
1 Most of the documents referred to here as the "torture memos" have been gathered
in THE TORTURE PAPERS, THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J.Greenberg & Joshua L.
Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE TORTURE PAPERS]. The torture memos mostly consist
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interrogating persons detained pursuant to the global war, the memos develop
extraordinary definitions for terms such as "torture" and "transfer." In the
contorted world of the memos, inflicting pain is not torture unless the pain is
as great as that associated with organ failure and death. 2 In the memos,
moving someone from one country to another a country, where the detainee
3
is likely to be subjected to torture, is not transfer if the move is temporary.
The memos also assert that even though torture is absolutely prohibited, the
President under his "complete discretion in the exercise of his Commander4
in-Chief authority" may authorize anything.

of legal analysis by lawyers in the Bush White House, Department of Justice, and
Department of Defense. They generally argue that the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
other international human rights and humanitarian law do not apply to persons in United
States detention pursuant to the global war on terror. Id. They also present arguments that
prosecutions will not result even if interrogators use techniques involving torture,
coercion, inhumanity, and abuse. Id.; see, in particular, Alberto Gonzales, Memorandum
for the President Re: Decision Re: Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of
War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in THE
TORTURE PAPERS, 118 [hereinafter Gonzales Decision]; Jay S. Bybee, Memorandum for
Alberto R. Gonzales Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS 172 [hereinafter
Bybee Memorandum]; Letter from John Yoo to Alberto R. Gonzales (Aug. 1, 2002),
reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS 218; Working Group Report on Detainee
Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy,
and Operational Considerations (Apr. 4, 2003), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS 286
[hereinafter Working Group Report] (also known as the "Haynes Memorandum"). See
also Michiko Kakutani, Following a Paper Trail to the Roots of Torture, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 2005, at El (book review).
2 "Torture," according to the memos, is an act that inflicts extraordinary pain
amounting to that experienced with organ failure or death, or mental suffering that lasts
"months or even years." Bybee Memorandum, supra note 1, at 176-77. The memos
reject inclusion in the definition of torture such well-known tortures as burning with a
cigarette, electric shock, having digits cut off, fingernails pulled out, or needles shoved
under fingernails. Id. The memos do not explain how anyone knows what the pain
associated with death feels like.
3 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 "prohibits
individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from
occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country,
occupied or not ... regardless of their motive." Id.
See Jack Goldsmith, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales Re: Permissibility of
Relocating Certain "Protected Persons" from Occupied Iraq (Mar. 19, 2004), reprintedin
THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 367. This memo constructs the argument that
"illegal aliens" are not covered by the prohibition, nor are "temporary" transfers. Id.
4 Working Group Report, supra note 1, at 302-07.

2005]

AFFIRMING THE BAN ON HARSH IVTERROGA TION

1233

Much has been and will be written about the expedient and erroneous
legal analysis of the memos. 5 One issue at risk of being overlooked, however,
because the memos emphasize torture, is that the United States must respect
limits far short of torture in the conduct of interrogations. The United States
may not use any form of coercion against persons detained in armed conflict,
nor may it engage in cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment at any time.
The great effort of the memo-writers to restrict torture to the most
extreme conduct imaginable obscures the fact that the United States has
wider obligations. Avoiding torture is not enough. Interrogators must also
respect the broader restrictions on coercive, cruel, inhuman, and degrading
6
treatment.
The United States military and United States law enforcement officers
know how to interrogate without using coercive or cruel techniques-as do

5 Dean Harold Koh, during confirmation hearings for Judge Alberto Gonzales, made
this assessment of one early memo that was largely copied in later memos: "[I]n my
professional opinion, as a law professor and a law dean, the Bybee memorandum is
perhaps the most clearly legally erroneous opinion I have ever heard." Confirmation
Hearing on the Nomination of Alberto R. Gonzales to be Attorney General of the United
States before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) (statement of Dean
Harold Koh). For a later memo that copies much of the Bybee Memorandum, see the
Working Group Report, supra note 1, at 286. Accord Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans
and Authorizations to Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and
InterrogationofDetainees,43 COLUM. J. TRANSN'L L. 811 (2005).
See also the views of two eminent professors of international law regarding the
memo-writers' breach of professional ethics and possible implication in the law
violations resulting from their erroneous advice. Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts,
Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 689 (2004). In addition,
see the statement by the former Legal Advisor to the State Department of the erroneous
positions taken by lawyers at the Justice Department, the White House, and the Pentagon
regarding detention law. Jess Bravin, U.S. Mishandled PrisonerPolicy, Ex-Adviser Says,
WALL ST.J., Apr. 5, 2005, at B9.
6 The main theme of several of the torture memos concerns how much the
interrogator can get away with. They particularly focus on what acts might lead to
prosecution in the United States. As a result, the torture memos focus to a large extent on
what violations of international law have been implemented in United States law. While
it is true that international legal obligations implemented in national law may be easier to
enforce in national courts than obligations not so implemented, it is a mistake to think
that the United States must only respect such obligations. Americans must respect all the
international legal obligations binding on the United States, whether in the form of
customary international law, treaties, or general principles.
And while it is also true that the legal obligation to enforce the prohibition on torture
generally is more emphatic than the obligation to enforce the other obligations discussed
here, the United States still has obligations to prevent all of these unlawful forms of
interrogation. For a discussion of the obligation to enforce grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, see infra Part III.B.
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the military and police of our peer nations. They have done so successfully
for decades. 7 So why did the Administration's lawyers work so hard to argue
that our interrogators could use coercive and cruel techniques with impunity?
We do not yet know the answer, but we can suggest two plausible
explanations. First, it may be that the tactics have nothing to do with
information-gathering, but rather aim to send a message to other would-be
terrorists. Administration officials might have decided to adopt the use of
tactics that would terrorize detainees in the hope of deterring potential
recruits to terrorism. 8 Or, it may be that some in the Administration have
become persuaded that torture, coercion, cruelty, and abuse can be effective
methods of interrogation, and that the need for information outweighs the
immorality of using such means. Yet the weight of the evidence is firmly
against the conclusion that forceful interrogation is as reliable as non-forceful
methods. In fact, the evidence on information-gathering supports
international law's absolute prohibition on torture, cruelty, and coercion. 9
Regardless of the reasons for the Administration's lawyers' attempts to
create a legal climate in which interrogation techniques involving less than
torture could be used, it is imperative to set the legal record straight. 10
Interrogators face restrictions far stricter than a simple ban on torture. This
Article reviews those restrictions.

7 See infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
8 While no firm evidence of a plan to use torture and abuse for deterrence has come
to light, plenty of information about the abusive treatment of persons in United States
detention has become public, including photos. Cofer Black, the United States counterterrorism coordinator stated that after 9/11 "the gloves came off." Mark Bowden, The
Dark Art of Interrogation: A Survey of the Landscape of Persuasion, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Oct. 1, 2003, at 56.
Apparently there is even a term for torture aimed at deterring terrorists--"terrorist
torture." See Daniel Stetman, The Question of Absolute Morality Regarding the
Prohibitionon Torture, 4 LAW & Gov'T 161, 162 (1997.)
9 The practical and moral issues raised by coercive interrogation are discussed in
Part III, infra.
10 The memos explain why coercive, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment is, in
the view of the writers, generally available to interrogators. They assert that torture may
also be used, but only with the President's authorization or where the interrogator can
claim it is necessary. Working Group Report, supra note 1, at 302-07. A new Justice
Department memo that purportedly "supersedes" the Bybee memo does not reject the
asserted right to use coercion and abuse, nor does it state unequivocally that the President
may never authorize unlawful methods. See Donald Levin, Memorandum for James B.
Comey Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, Dec. 30, 2004,
availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf.
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The law relevant to the practice of interrogation is found in two great
bodies of international legal principles, in addition to domestic law. I I During
armed conflict and occupation, international humanitarian law (IHL) applies.
IHL expressly prohibits not just torture, but any form of coercion of
detainees during interrogation. Second, international human rights law
applies to persons detained outside of an armed conflict, but also, to a certain
extent, to wartime detainees as well. Human rights law prohibits torture as
well as cruel, inhuman, and degrading interrogation techniques. These
international obligations have been partially implemented in United States
domestic law. 12 Even where they have not been implemented, the United
States remains bound to respect them. 13
Yet we now have irrefutable evidence of widespread use of unlawful
interrogation techniques by American interrogators in Afghanistan, Iraq,
Guantanamo Bay, and at undisclosed locations. 14 The memo-writers have

11 This Article takes a classical approach to international law, meaning that it is
grounded in both positivism (modified by normative principle) and formalism. It is an
approach that stands in marked contrast to the hegemonic approach of the
Administration. Compare Detlev Vagts, Hegemonic InternationalLaw, 95 AM. J. INT'L
L. 843, 844 (2001) with Mary Ellen O'Connell, Taking Opinio Juris Seriously, A
Classical Approach to International Law on the Use of Force, in INTERNATIONAL
CUSTOMARY LAW ON THE USE OF FORCE: A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 9 (Enzo

Cannizzaro & Paolo Palchetti eds., 2005); Anne Orford, The Gift of Formalism, 15 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 1, 179 (2004); Mary Ellen O'Connell, The End of Legitimacy, 2004 AM. J.
INT'L L. 269; James Hathaway, America, Defender of Democratic Legitimacy?, 11 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 121, 129 (2000); Martti Koskenniemi, 'The Lady Doth Protest Too Much,'
Kosovo and the Turn to Ethics in InternationalLaw, 65 MOD. L. REv. 159 (2002).
12 See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (West Supp. 2005).
13 All international actors are bound by international law. Aspects of a state's
domestic law that might put the state into a situation of breach of international law is no
defense to the breach. The International Court of Justice has referred to this as a
fundamental principle of international law: "[It is a] fundamental principle of
international law that international law prevails over domestic law." Applicability of the
Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement
of 26 June 1947, 1988 I.C.J. 12, para. 57 (Apr. 26). The United States Supreme Court has
confirmed that international law is part of United States law. The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts."); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 752 (2004) ("For
two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes the
law of nations." The term "international law" is generally used in place of the term "law
of nations" today.)
14 An extraordinary amount of evidence is now available on the use of unlawful
interrogation techniques at all detention centers operated by the United States in
Afghanistan, Iraq, at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and at undisclosed locations since
September 11. First, Time magazine obtained an interrogator's log from Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. The log details how, in addition to other unlawful treatment, a detainee was
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apparently been successful in creating the impression among interrogators
that they may do anything to an interrogee short of intentionally inflicting the
pain of organ failure or death. The American Civil Liberties Union
summarized FBI e-mails on the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, in the summer of 2004:
[D]etainees were shackled hand and foot in a fetal position on the floor. The
agent states that the detainees were kept in that position for 18 to 24 hours
at a time and most had "urinated or defacated [sic]" on themselves. On one
occasion, the agent reports having seen a detainee left in an unventilated,
non-air conditioned room at a temperature "probably well over a hundred

forcibly given three and one-half bags of intravenous fluid, then forced to urinate on
himself. Adam Zagorin & Michael Duffy, Inside the Interrogation of Detainee 063,

June 20, 2005, at 26, 30. Second, CIA Director Porter Goss testified in March 2005
that the CIA is currently using lawful interrogation methods. He would not confirm
whether this was the case in the recent past, but he added that he considers
"waterboarding" a "professional interrogation technique" and, therefore, acceptable.
Waterboarding involves tying someone to a board and dunking him underwater to the
point he fears he will drown. It is plainly a form of torture. Douglas Jehl, Questions Left
by C.I.A. Chief on Torture Use, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2005, at Al; see also Editorial,
TIME,

Abuse in Secret, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2005, at A18. Third, communications from FBI

agents have confirmed that beating, burning, sexual humiliation, and shackling for
twenty-four hours at a time without relief, food, or water have all been used in connection
with interrogation at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The FBI documents were released to
human rights organizations pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request. American
Civil Liberties Union, Newly ObtainedFBI Records Call Defense Department's Methods
"Torture," Express Concerns Over "Cover-Up" That May Leave FBI "Holding the
Bag"
for
Abuses,
Dec.
20,
2004,

http://www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID= 17216&c=206
[hereinafter
ACLU].
Fourth, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also reported in July 2004
on the use of interrogation techniques "tantamount to torture" at Guantanamo Bay.
Demetri Sevastopulo & Frances Williams, Red Cross Accuses US Over Guantanamo,
IRISH TIMES, Dec. 1, 2004, at 13; Neil A. Lewis, Fresh Details Emerge on Harsh
Methods at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at All. Fifth, the ICRC has also

reported on the use of techniques "tantamount to torture" against persons thought to have
information throughout the United States' Iraqi detention centers. See International
Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of
Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During
Arrest, Internment and Interrogation (Feb. 2004), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS,
supra note 1, at 383, 384-85. Finally, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, by his own
admission, authorized the use of unlawful interrogation techniques at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba during December 2002. He also admitted to the unlawful transfer of persons out of
Iraq to undisclosed locations for interrogation by the CIA and other persons known to use
torture. See infra note 52 and accompanying text. See also MARK DANNER, TORTURE &
TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2004); Congressional
Testimony of Tom Malinowski, Human Rights Watch, Mar. 18, 2005, available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/18/usintI 0347.htm.
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degrees." The agent notes: "The detainee was almost unconscious on the
apparently been literally
floor, with a pile of hair next to him. He had
15
night."
the
throughout
out
hair
pulling his own

The law of interrogation, however, prohibits all of this treatment. It
prohibits not only torture, but coercion and cruelty as well. The conclusion
here is that the President of the United States may no more authorize the use
of coercion and cruelty against detainees than he may authorize torture. The
proposal of Harvard Law School Professor Alan Dershowitz for a
presidential "torture warrant" is an invitation for the President to violate
international law. 16 But so would a warrant to allow coercion or cruelty in
interrogation.
To the extent that torture, coercion, and cruelty have already occurred,
the perpetrators have committed crimes. Their superiors may also be guilty
of criminal wrongdoing if they gave orders or authorized the use of unlawful
techniques and knew that a crime would likely result from the order or if they
knew of such offenses and did not stop them and report the criminal
activity. 17 Nor should reliance on the expedient legal advice contained in the
torture memos be a defense. 18 Lawsuits have already begun against the
United States and Bush Administration officials in a variety of fora. 19 Civil
suits by victims have ample legal basis, but their success will depend on the

15 ACLU, supra note 14.
16 See Alan M. Dershowitz, Stop Winking at Torture and Codify It: US. Must
Decide Which Interrogation Tactics Are Allowable and Which Aren 't, L.A. TIMES, June
13, 2004, at 5.
17 Prosecutor v. Timor Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment,
42 (July 29,
2004) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia).
18 This is a complex topic that cannot .be developed here beyond one example. The
Nuremberg Tribunal did not excuse Germany's high political leaders for invading
Norway, Denmark, and the Low Countries despite the fact that the Foreign Minister
Joachim von Ribbentrop had personally developed legal justifications for doing so. On
the contrary, part of the case against Ribbentrop himself consisted of having developed
these expedient legal arguments. 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 286 (1947); see also Bilder & Vagts, supra note 5,
at 694.
19 See the website of the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) for details
regarding a request that the German State Prosecutor open a criminal investigation of
United States personnel linked to the detainee abuse scandal and for details regarding a
civil suit against private contractors for their role in abuse of detainees in Iraq.
http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/home.asp [hereinafter CCR]. See the website of Human Rights
First or the American Civil Liberties Union for details of a civil suit against Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and former CIA Director George Tenet for abuse of
detainees. http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/index.html; http://www.aclu.org. See also
discussion of additional cases, infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
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courage of judges in applying the binding law against the Administration of
the world's most powerful nation.2 0
The remainder of this Article examines the wartime ban on coercion, the
peacetime ban, and the arguments for ignoring the bans.
I. THE WARTIME BAN
The law applicable to interrogation during war or armed conflict is part
of the larger body of rules called international humanitarian law or IHL. 2 1
IHL consists of the famous and respected 1949 Geneva Conventions, 22 the
1977 Additional Protocols thereto, 23 the Hague Conventions of 1899 and
1907,24 several other lesser-known treaties, 2 5 and principles of customary

20 The request by CCR to the German State Prosecutor was initially dismissed
apparently in connection with Donald Rumsfeld's attendance at a security conference in
Munich. The claimants appealed. CCR, supra note 19.
21 The United States military prefers the term "law of armed conflict" or "LOAC,"
but the International Committee of the Red Cross, the guardian of this law, uses the term
"international humanitarian law," as does the International Court of Justice, the chief
legal organ of the United Nations. See, e.g., The Legal Consequences of the Construction
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 20, para.
89 (July 9).
22 The two conventions relevant to this article are Geneva Convention [III] Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter
Prisoner's Convention] and Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Civilian's
Convention]. Alberto Gonzales, United States Attorney General in the second George W.
Bush Administration, called the Conventions "quaint" and "obsolete." Gonzales
Decision, supra note 1, at 119. He did so just months before the U.S. Secretary of
Defense demanded of Saddam Hussein that the Geneva Conventions be respected in
detail with regard to United States service personnel captured in the invasion of Iraq. See,
e.g., Jamie Fellner, Prisoners of War in Iraq and at Guantanamo, Double Standards,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 31, 2003, at 8; Dawn Walton, War on Iraq: Prisonersof War:
Geneva Conventions, U.S. Infuriated by Footage of PoWs, GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 24,
2003, at A5.
23 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
24 The most important of the fourteen conventions is the Convention Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907 Hague Convention IV), Annex, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277.
25 See, e.g., The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, Aug. 7, 1956, 249 U.N.T.S. 240.
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international law. 26 In an international armed conflict, IHL reflects three
categories of individuals relevant to this discussion of interrogation:
combatants, civilians, and unlawful combatants. 27 We will consider each of
these categories in turn, and then consider the rules prohibiting coercive
interrogation with respect to each category. First, however, a few words on
Bush Administration assertions that some wartime detainees have no legal
protections while in detention.
28

A. The Administration's Use and Abuse of lHL

The extraordinary conclusion by the Administration that some
individuals have no right not to be tortured or abused while in detention is
simply wrong. It appears to grow out of several other Administration policies
that are, in themselves, based on erroneous and sometimes even
contradictory legal analyses. First, the Administration has declared that the
United States is involved in a global war on terrorism based not on the fact of
worldwide hostilities, but rather on the existence of terrorists in many parts
of the world. 29 Second, despite this declaration, the Administration applies
IHL in its global war only where IHL seems to give it advantages. Where
applying IHL entails disadvantages, the Administration argues that it does
not apply. For example, the Administration claims the combatant's privilege

26

See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, I & II CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005); see
also MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 522-78

(2005).
One of the many erroneous statements in the torture memos is that the executive
branch is not bound by customary international law since it is "not Federal law."
Working Group Report, supra note 1, at 290. That has never been the official position of
the United States. Indeed, it would lead to unending complications and absurd situations
because the United States federal government bases so much on customary international
law-such as treaty law and maritime claims. At any rate, the Supreme Court stated
clearly that customary international law is part of federal common law in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
27 Some authors refer to certain unlawful combatants as "unprivileged belligerents."
See Charles Garraway, Interoperabilityand the Atlantic Divide-A Bridge Over Troubled
Waters, 34 Is. YBK. H. R. 105, 107-17 (2004).
28 Marco Sass6li, Use andAbuse of the Laws of War in the "War on Terrorism," 22
LAW & INEQ. 195, 210 (2004) (citing LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., ASSESSING THE
NEW NORMAL: LIBERTY AND SECURITY FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES 53,

108 (2003)).
29
Mary Ellen O'Connell, Ad Hoc War, in KRISENSICHERUNG UND HUMANITARER
SCHUTZ-CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION 405 (Horst Fischer et

al. eds., 2004).
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to kill on the battlefield with respect to alleged terrorists wherever they are
found. It claims this privilege even outside zones of active hostilities, arguing
that all the world is a battlefield. 30 Yet, the Administration does not really
behave as though the entire world became a battlefield on September 11,
2001. It surely does not recognize that American military personnel may be
targeted everywhere in the world. In addition, the letters it sent to the United
Nations Security Council to justify the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq did
not mention a worldwide war. 3 1 Indeed, if it recognized such a worldwide
war, why send letters justifying the use of force in particular locations?
In addition to the combatant's privilege, the Administration apparently
intends to detain people indefinitely on the basis of the IHL right to detain
combatants until the end of active hostilities without the requirement of a
trial.32 Yet the Administration refuses to extend IHL detainee protections,
such as the right to be free from coercion of any kind during interrogation,
the right to be visited by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and
33
the right to have detainee status reviewed.
The Administration conveniently overlooks the fact that "combatant" is
defined in international law. Such a status cannot simply be declared. A
combatant is someone who takes direct part in hostilities. 34 A situation of
hostilities is one of intense, inter-group, armed fighting. 3 5 The rights to kill
without warning and to detain until the end of hostilities grow out of these
situations, situations too chaotic for the usual criminal law to apply. Not only
does IHL simply not apply to criminal activity outside of situations of
hostilities, states traditionally resist elevating criminals to the plane of
combatants. To do so acknowledges that the military challenge to the state
has reached the point of chaos and emergency where the national criminal
law can no longer apply. Nevertheless, the Administration has declared that
all terrorists are combatants whether the alleged terrorists have been in an

30

Id.at 405, 415-17.
31 Letter dated Mar. 20, 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the President of the Security Council, United Nations, UN Doc.
S/2003/351 (Mar. 21, 2003); Letter dated Oct. 7, 2001 from the Permanent
Representative of the United States of America to the President of the Security Council,
United Nations, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (Oct. 8, 2001).
32

Id. at 421-25.
33 See generally Sass6li, supranote 28.
34
Id. at 210.
35 O'Connell, supra note 29, at 407-14; see also Silvia Borelli, Casting Light on the
Legal Black Hole: InternationalLaw and Detentions Abroad in the "War on Terror,"
857 INT'L REV. RED CRoss 39, 45-46, 52-53 (2005); Christopher Greenwood, War,
Terrorism, andInternationalLaw, 56 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 505, 529 (2003).
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armed conflict or not. 36 And it has declared that none of these combatants37
real or constructed-has a right to IHL protections.
One hardly need respond to these brazen positions. But, in brief, all
persons caught up in armed conflict have at least some protection under IHL.
State leaders have no discretion to refuse to extend these protections. Persons
in non-conflict situations have basic peacetime human rights protections. 38
Again, the core protections are non-derogable. It is simply not the case, as
the Administration implies, that any human being can be placed in a situation
39
beyond the reach of law-there are no "legal black holes.",
The Administration refuses to recognize that when al Qaeda members
actually are combatants because they take direct part in hostilities, such as in
Afghanistan or Iraq, they must be covered by IHL. When al Qaeda members
carry out criminal acts in non-conflict situations, such as in Yemen, the
United States, or Germany, peacetime criminal law applies. Criminal
suspects may not be detained indefinitely without a trial; they may not be
killed without warning, and they may not be interrogated using cruel,
inhuman, or degrading methods.
The creation of the myth that some persons have no IHL protections
apparently laid the foundation for the torture, coercion, and abuse of persons
in United States detention. 4 0 The prevailing view at detention centers appears
to be that because the Administration says that terrorists are not protected by
the Geneva Conventions or by other IHL, they are not. The President has
extended what he considers a discretionary promise to treat detainees
humanely, but even that gesture is hedged by limiting it to the extent required
by military necessity.
B. UniversalJHL Protection
Turning away from the Administration's version of the law to what the
law actually requires, we find under IHL that persons who are members of

36 Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of
Defense, to Members of the ASIL-CFR Roundtable, Enemy Combatants (Dec. 12, 2002),
availableat http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=5312 [hereinafter Haynes Memo]
37 See Gonzales Decision, supra note 1, at 118; see also Haynes Memo.
38 See infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
39 This is an expression used by several human rights organizations to describe what
the Bush Administration has tried to do with respect to denying any human rights to
certain persons in its custody. See, e.g., Amnesty International, Torture: No Place in the
World in the Twenty-First Century (Nov. 23, 2004), availableat 2004 WLNR 17043063.
40 This is certainly the view of many human rights organizations and Democratic
law-makers. See, e.g., Curt Anderson, Memos Outlined How US. Saw Geneva Rules,
SEATTLE TIMES, June 10, 2004, at AI0.
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the regular armed forces of a state involved in an armed conflict, and persons
who take direct part in the armed conflict, are combatants. 4 1 If a combatant
has a right to take part in hostilities-such as the regular members of the
armed forces, militia members meeting certain criteria, or civilians involved
in a levee en masse42-he is a lawful combatant. A person who has no right
to take part is an unlawful combatant. 43 Persons taking no direct part are
civilians. Different rules apply as to the wartime right to target and detain
persons in each category-lawful combatant, unlawful combatant, and
civilian. No person, regardless of category, may be tortured, coerced, or
abused during interrogation.
In an armed conflict between two or more parties to the Geneva
Conventions, lawful combatants detained by an adverse power must be
treated as prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Prisoner's Convention). Under Article 17
of the Prisoner's Convention:
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be
inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind
whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened,
insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any
kind.44
Civilians are protected under the Fourth Geneva Convention (Civilian's
Convention). If they are detained by an adverse power or an occupying
power, then Article 31 applies: "No physical or moral coercion shall be
exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from
45
them or from third parties."

See O'CONNELL, supra note 26, at 415-18.
The lev4e en masse occurs when the civilian population spontaneously takes up
arms to resist an invading army when there is no time to organize.
43 For more on this category, see Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enhancing the Status of
Non-State Actors Through a Global War on Terror, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 435
41

42

(2005); Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal
Construction of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 1, 37-55 (2004); Knut D6rmann, The
Legal Situation of "Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants," 85 INT'L REV. OF THE RED
CROSs 45 (2003); George Aldrich, The Taleban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of
Illegal Combatants,96 AM. J. INT'L L. 891 (2002).

Prisoner's Convention, supra note 22, art. 17 (emphasis added).
Civilian's Convention, supra note 22, art. 31. Article 4 of the Civilian's
Convention excludes nationals of the detaining power and the detaining power's cobelligerents or certain neutral states even if a party to the Convention. Id.art. 4. Such
persons are nevertheless protected under the fundamental guarantees owed to anyone
44
45
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Unlawful combatants should be treated as prisoners of war who have
committed a criminal offense. 46 At a minimum, however, such persons,
indeed all persons, detained in an international armed conflict are entitled to
the protections of Additional Protocol I, Article 75. Article 75 is part of
customary international law, and therefore binding on all states. 47 The United
States shares this position. The United States is not a party to Additional
Protocol I, but has accepted many of its provisions as customary international
law including, in particular, Article 75:48
1. [P]ersons who are in the power of a Party to the conflict and who do
not benefit from more favourable treatment under the [1949] Conventions
or under this Protocol shall be treated humanely in all circumstances...
Each Party shall respect the person, honour, convictions and religious
practices of all such persons.
2. The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in
any place whatsoever, whether committed by civilian or by military agents:
caught in armed conflict. Infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. U.S. nationals also
have constitutional law protections. Infra notes 86-100 and accompanying text.
46 Additional Protocol I has two provisions particularly relevant to the detention of
persons who fight in hostilities but who do not meet the criteria of lawful combatant:
Article 44 (4) A combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while
failing to meet the requirements set forth in the second sentence of paragraph 3 shall
forfeit his right to be a prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be given
protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war by the
Third Convention and by this Protocol. This protection includes protections
equivalent to those accorded to prisoners of war by the Third Convention in the case
where such a person is tried and punished for any offences he has committed.
Article 45 (3) Any person who has taken part in hostilities, who is not entitled
to prisoner-of-war status and who does not benefit from more favourable treatment
in accordance with the Fourth Convention shall have the right at all times to the
protection of Article 75 of this Protocol. In occupied territory, any such person,
unless he is held as a spy, shall also be entitled, notwithstanding Article 5 of the
Fourth Convention, to his rights of communication under that Convention.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 23, arts. 44, 45.
47 A state that persistently objects at the time a rule of customary law is in formation
may not be bound. The persistent objector rule, however, does not apply to the most
important principles of international law, the jus cogens or peremptory norms. It is
widely held that the prohibition on torture and other elements of Article 75 are jus
cogens. Moreover, the United States is not a persistent objector to Article 75. The attempt
by some in the Bush Administration to protest the rule in 2004-2005 simply comes too
late. All of Article 75,jus cogens or not, binds the United States.
48 Michael J. Matheson, Session One: The UnitedStates Position on the Relation of
Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, 2 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL' Y 419-31 (1987); see also Paust, supra note 5,
at 818 n.27.
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(a) Violence to the life, health, or physical or mental well-being of
persons, in particular:
(i) Murder;
(ii) Torture of all kinds, whether physical or mental;
(iii) Corporal punishment and;
(iv) Mutilation;
(b) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
49
(e) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.

While the word "coercion" does not appear in Article 75, techniques
such as denying detainees religious material, forcefully shaving them,
stripping them, and menacing them with dogs are plainly disallowed. 50
In civil war, torture and cruel treatment are also prohibited. Following
the transfer of political authority from the United States to Iraqis, the
situation in Iraq is best characterized as civil war. Article 3, common to all
four Geneva Conventions, includes the following basic protections for all
persons detained in a civil war:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character ... each
Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following
provisions:
(I) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities.... shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded
on race, colour, religion or, faith, sex, birth, or wealth, or any other similar
criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any
time and in any place whatsoever with respect the above-mentioned
persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and

49 Additional Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 75.
50 One author, in an analysis of the Geneva Conventions, describes coercion as
follows: "The essence of coercion is the compulsion of a person by a superior force, often
a government, to do or refrain from doing something involuntarily. The intentional
application of an unlawful force that robs a person of free will is coercive." Jennifer K.
Elsea, Lawfulness of Interrogation Techniques Under the Geneva Conventions, Cong.
Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code RL32567 (Sept. 8, 2004), at 13,
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32567.pdf. Bowden calls coercion "torture
lite." Bowden, supra note 8, at 53.
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degrading treatment. 51
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld authorized the use of techniques at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, including stress positions, forced grooming, nudity,
dogs, and physical coercion. 52 General Sanchez authorized the use of
muzzled dogs to threaten detainees, stress positions, isolation, and sleep
deprivation in Iraq. 53 One need not elaborate for present purposes on the
patently unlawful and abhorrent technique of "waterboarding," practiced by
the CIA at undisclosed locations, 54 or on the practices observed by the FBI at
Guantanamo Bay, including chaining a person in the fetal position for
twenty-four hours without relief, sexual abuse and humiliation, and burning
55
the inside of the ear with cigarettes.
Neither the Geneva Conventions nor the Additional Protocols allow
derogation from IHL interrogation protections on the basis of necessity.
While the Conventions do recognize military necessity as a defense or
standard against which to measure some actions, no necessity defense is
56
provided respecting the provisions just discussed.

Despite these clear mandates of IHL, the media have reported that the
United States military is developing a new policy on detainee operations that
creates a category called "enemy combatant," whose protections may be

"subject to military necessity.

' 57

Plainly, IHL provides no military necessity

51 Prisoner's Convention, supra note 22, art. 3.
52 See William J. Hanyes II, Counter Resistance Techniques, Dec. 2, 2002, in THE
TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 236; see also, Donald Rumsfeld, Counter Resistance
Techniques, Jan. 15, 2003, in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 239; Tim Golden &
Don Van Natta, Jr., U.S. Said to Overstate Value of Guatdnamo Detainees, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 2004, at Al.
53 Memorandum from Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez to Commander U.S. Central
Command Re: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (Sept. 14, 2003),
availableat http://www.aclu.org/Files/OpenFile.cfm?id= 17850.
54 For a discussion of evidence of CIA unlawful interrogation methods, including
waterboarding, see supra note 14.
55 For a discussion of FBI communications on unlawful interrogations techniques at
Guantanamo Bay, see supra note 14.
56 It should be emphasized that becoming a party to a treaty is a voluntary act by a
state. In the case of the United States, it required consent of two-thirds of the Senate and
ratification by the President to become a party to the Geneva Conventions, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention Against
Torture. See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
57 Associated Press, Pentagon Will Spell Out Care, Handling of Detainees, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 9, 2005, at A30. Also, when Republican Senators McCain,
Warner, and Graham tried to introduce legislation in the summer of 2005 requiring
compliance with existing law on treatment of detainees, Vice President Cheney said that
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exception to the interrogation protections enjoyed by any detainee.
In addition to the protections of IHL from torture, coercion, and abuse,
the Geneva Conventions require that each party take certain implementation
and enforcement measures. Parties to the Conventions must train their
personnel in the rules and investigate and prosecute violations. All parties to
the Conventions have an obligation to prosecute grave breaches of the
Conventions: "Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to
search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be
committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of
58
their nationality, before its own courts."
The grave breaches of the Civilian's Convention are found in Article 146
and include torture and inhuman treatment. These are the violations of the
Convention that all parties have a duty to aid in enforcing. The Official
Commentary indicates that Article 146 uses the "legal meaning" of "torture,"
which is "the infliction of suffering on a person in order to obtain from that
person, or from another person, confessions or information. ' 59 Inhuman
treatment refers to more than "physical injury or injury to health. Certain
measures, for example, which might cut the civilian internees off completely
from the outside world and in particular from their families, or which caused
grave injury to their human dignity, could conceivably be considered as
'60
inhuman treatment.
The "grave breaches" provision of the Prisoner's Convention, Article
130, also includes "torture or inhuman treatment" as grave breaches of the
Convention. The Official Commentary defines "torture" as the "infliction of
suffering on a person in order to obtain from that person, or from another
person, confessions or information." 61 "Inhuman treatment" includes "certain
measures, for example, which might cut prisoners of war off completely from
the outside world and in particular from their families, or which would cause
great injury to their human dignity ...."62 Additional Protocol I reiterates
and adds to the list of grave breaches and of the obligations on parties to take
enforcement measures.
The following law relative to interrogation was applied in 2003 by the
Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission:
the legislation would interfere with the President's authority. Eric Schmitt, Cheney
Working to Block Legislation on Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2005, at A23.
58 Civilian's Convention, supra note 22, art. 146; Prisoner's Convention, supra note

22, art. 129.
59 IV COMMENTARY TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE
PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 598 (Jean Picet ed., 1958).
60 Prisoner's Convention, supra note 22, art. 130.
61 111 COMMENTARY

TO THE

1949 GENEVA CONVENTION

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 627 (Jean Pictet ed., 1960).
62 Id. at 17.

RELATIVE TO THE
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75. Ethiopia alleges frequent abuse in Eritrea's interrogation of POWs
commencing at capture and evacuation. International law does not prohibit
the interrogation of POWs, but it does restrict the information they are
obliged to reveal and prohibits torture or other measures of coercion,
including threats and "unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any
kind."
76. Ethiopia presented clear and convincing evidence, unrebutted by
Eritrea, that Eritrean interrogators frequently threatened or beat POWs
during interrogation, particularly when they were dissatisfied with the
prisoner's answers. The Commission must conclude that Eritrea either failed
to train its interrogators in the relevant legal restraints or to make it clear
that they are imperative. Consequently, Eritrea is liable for permitting such
63
coercive interrogation.
II. THE PEACETIME BAN
Persons detained outside an armed conflict or zone of occupation are not
subject to the law of armed conflict, but rather to the law of peace. National
criminal law in the first instance determines who may be detained and how
individuals must be treated. National treatment is subject to international
human rights law as the United States itself has made clear in its criticism of
countries from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe.
Prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment has been
at the core of modern human rights law since the human rights movement
began in the aftermath of World War II. Article 5 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights states that "[n]o one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." 64 This
principle has been reconfirmed, restated, and elaborated in a series of
important treaties, including the International Covenant on Political and Civil
Rights (Article 7) (ICCPR),6 5 the American Convention on Human Rights
(Article 5),66 the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights

63 Fed. Democratic Republic of Ethiopia v. State of Eritrea (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2003),
available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/PDF/ET04%20-%2Part/ 203.pdf.
64 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5, G.A. Res. 217(III)A, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/217 (1948).
65 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc A/6316 (Mar. 23, 1976)
[hereinafter ICCPR].
66 American Convention on Human Rights, art. 5, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S.
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and Fundamental Freedoms (Article 3),67 the Convention Against Torture
(Article 1, Article 16),68 and the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights (Article 5).69 The customary international law of human
rights also prohibits torture as well as cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment. 70
The European Convention's prohibition in Article 3 has been the subject
of a series of cases at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and
thus forms the basis of sophisticated jurisprudence on torture, inhuman, and
degrading treatment. In addition, the European Court has in recent years
71
taken the Convention Against Torture (CAT) into account in its decisions,
and, thus, the ECHR's jurisprudence on torture, cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment is informative for all parties to the CAT, including the
United States. The European Convention's Article 3 mandates that "no one
shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
72
punishment.
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands brought the first Article
3 complaint against Greece in 1967 for the severe beating of individuals to
obtain information about suspected subversive activities. 73 The European
Commission on Human Rights found that beating persons to obtain
information was torture. In 1976, the European Court of Human Rights
decided a landmark case between Ireland and Britain over British detention
and interrogation practices in Northern Ireland during the early 1970s that

67 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 3, Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECPHR].
68 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, arts. 1, 16, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
69 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 5, June 27, 1981, 21
I.L.M. 58 (1982).
70

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 702 (1987) ("Customary International Law of Human Rights: A state violates
international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages or
condones... (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.")
71 In Ilhan v. Turkey and Salman v. Turkey, the Court expressly referenced the
Convention Against Torture. Ithan v. Turkey, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36, 869, 905 (2002);
Salman v. Turkey, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 17, 425, 447 (2002). While the ECHR's decisions
are not binding on the United States per se, its interpretation and application of a treaty
that is binding on the United States is authoritative for the United States.
72 ECPHR, supra note 67, art. 3.
73 The Greek Case, 12 Y.B. EuR. CoNY. ON H.R. 1, 186 (1969).
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included hooding, sleep deprivation, and restricted diets. 74 The court
distinguished between torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, finding
that the practices violated Article 3, but did not amount to torture. The
techniques were nevertheless declared unlawful, and the United Kingdom
discontinued them. 75 Conditions of detention also fall under Article 3.
Prisons with no light, no open air, no communication, and no exercise space
have been considered to be in violation of Article 3.76 Additionally, sending
persons to a country where they might be tortured or subject to inhuman
treatment can itself be an inhuman action in violation of Article 3.77
In recent cases, the European Court has focused more on the purpose
behind the unlawful treatment rather than on trying to measure the severity of
pain. This approach is in line with the Convention Against Torture, 7 8 where
the focus is also on the purpose for which the victim is being subjected to
pain-to gain information or a confession. In Keenan v. UnitedKingdom, the
court stated that "[w]hile it is true that the severity of suffering ... has been a
significant consideration in many of the cases decided by the court under
Article 3, there are circumstances where proof of the actual effect on the
person may not be a major factor." 79 In a 2004 case, Aktas v. Turkey, Mr.
Aktas was presumptively beaten to death. 80 The Court had "no difficulty
drawing the inference that the suffering inflicted ...was particularly severe
and cruel,.., and that the purpose 1 of the perpetrators was to obtain
8
information or a confession of guilt."
The Human Rights Committee, charged with implementing the ICCPR,
has found the following to be cruel and inhuman treatment:

74 The Republic of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 25-26

(1978).
75 Under more recent decisions of the ECHR, some believe that the methods used by
the United Kingdom would amount to torture. See David Hope, Torture, 53 INT'L &
COMP. L. Q. 807, 826 (2004).
76 See Malcolm D. Evans,

Getting to Grips with Torture, 51 INT'L.

COMP. L. Q. 365,

372 (2002).
77 Id.

78 Convention Against Torture, supra note 68; see also Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, princ. 6, G.A.
Res. 43/173, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (Dec. 9,
1988).
79 Keenan v. United Kingdom, Eur. H.R. Rep. Comm. Supp., CD64, para. 113
(1998).
80 Aktas v. Turkey, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18, 333, 392-93 (2004).
81 Id. at 329.
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beating to point of unconsciousness; denial of appropriate medical care;
incommunicado detention for more than a year; repeated beatings with
clubs, pipes, and batons without medical attention; detainment in a cell
measuring twenty by five meters with 125 other prisoners and without any
food or water; death threats; incarceration in a cell for twenty-three hours
per day without bedding, food, sanitation, or natural light; being forced to
stand for thirty-five hours, with wrists bound by coarse cloth and eyes
continuously bandaged; and deprivation of food and drink for four days
following arrest while being detained in unsanitary conditions. 82
The Committee has found the following acts to be degrading:
dumping a bucket of urine on a prisoner's head, throwing his food and water
on the floor, and his mattress out of his cell; beating prisoners with rifle
butts and subsequently refusing them medical treatment; detaining
individuals in cages and displaying them to the media; assaulting prisoners
kept in tiny cells and limiting the number of visitors they may receive;
chaining detainees to bed springs for three months; rubbing salt
into prisoners' nasal passages and forcing them to spend the night chained
to a chair; administering beatings requiring stitches; blindfolding and
dunking detainees heads in a canal; denial of exercise, medical treatment,
and asthma medication; and whippings and beatings with a birch or
83
tamarind switch.
The European Court has also found that states will be in breach of
Article 3 not only when their own agents are perpetrating the ill-treatment,
but also when a state fails to prevent serious forms of ill-treatment from
84
occurring or fails to make adequate investigations into claims of abuse.
Furthermore, the court has expanded the definition of who can count as a
victim under Article 3. In Kurt v. Turkey, a mother who witnessed the
abduction of her son was considered a victim of an Article 3 violation. 85
The United States understands the prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment of the Convention Against Torture to be the same as
the prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" in the United States

82 Jason R. Odeshoo, Truth or Dare?: Terrorism and "Truth Serum" in the Post9/11 World, 57 STAN. L. REv. 209, 243 (2004) (citing Linton v. Jamaica, Comm. No.
255/1987, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C46/D255/1987
(Nov. 2, 1992)); Polay Campos v. Peru, Comm. No. 577/1994, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts.
Comm., 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/61/D/577/1994 (Nov. 6, 1997)).
83 Odeshoo, supra note 82, at 243-44.
84 See Kaya v. Turkey, 2000-1I1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 151, App. no. 22535/93, 154 (2000).
85 See Kurt v. Turkey, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 373, 378 (1998).
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Constitution. 86 This may or may not be so. To the extent it is not, it cannot
alter America's legal obligations under the CAT, but American jurisprudence
should be helpful in understanding what is cruel and inhuman treatment in
interrogation. People are interrogated by law enforcement personnel in the
United States for two reasons: because they are suspected of having
committed a crime and the police are seeking a confession, or because they
are suspected of having information about a crime. We will briefly review
the protections around interrogations in both situations.
The United States Supreme Court ruled that the due process clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination require voluntary confessions of guilt. 8 7 More generally,
Justice Frankfurter wrote that "[c]oerced confessions offend the community's
sense of fair play and decency." 88 Before a jury can hear a confession, the
judge must make a determination by a preponderance of the evidence that the
confession was voluntarily given. 89 The court must consider the totality of
the circumstances regarding whether the defendant's will was actually
overborne. 90 Factors to consider include the suspect's age, education, and
mental and physical condition, along with the setting, duration, and manner
91
of police interrogation.

86 See U.S. Senate Resolution

of Advice

and Consent to Ratification of

the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 101st Cong., 136 CONG. REc. 36,192-93 (1990).
87 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMNAL PROCEDURE, 423-54 (3d ed., 2002); Welsh S. White, What Is
an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REv. 2001, 2009 (1998). The Eighth
Amendment is relevant, too, in its prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII.
88 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
89 Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486 (1972). Involuntary confessions are

inadmissible not because
such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to extract
them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that
ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system-a system in which the State
must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured ....
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).
90 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959).
91 Id.. at 321 (citing Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948)) (age); Payne v.
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 563 (1958) (education); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 19697 (1957) (low intelligence); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 230-31 (1940) (length
of detention); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 149 (1944) (the repeated and
prolonged nature of the questioning)); see also Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737,
740-41 (1966) (the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights). Other
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Confessions have been found to be involuntary for diverse reasons. A
confession was involuntary if the defendant was physically beaten or
subjected to an inordinately long interrogation. 92 A D.C. district court
considered a case in which a suspect was interrogated for passing an altered
dollar bill. After receiving Miranda warnings, the suspect was interrogated
by Secret Service agents who forced him to strip and stand naked for a period
of time while the questioning continued. The court found that in light of the
circumstances, the defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights and subsequent
93
confession were involuntary.
Police do trick and deceive defendants during interrogation. 94 However,
some promises and threats will make confessions inadmissible. Unlawful
threats are those of physical violence, refusal to provide medication, removal
of a spouse or child, the arrest of friends or family, and harsher punishments
if a confession is not made. 95 Promises that make a confession inadmissible
include those involving an impossible, improper, or illusory result, such as
promises of immunity and clemency. 96 Appeals to religious beliefs are only
coercive if they are designed to overcome the suspect's resistance by
97
appealing to his fear of divine judgment.
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court recognized that custodial
police interrogation is inherently coercive and held that a person in custody

factors to consider may be the race of the suspect and the suspect's prior experience with
police. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Proofof Facts § 2, at 550 (2004).
92 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S.
556, 561 (1954).
93 U.S. v. Blocker, 354 F.Supp. 1195, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1973):
Since the strip search in this case occurred at the outset of the interrogation, the only
reasonable conclusion is that the agents conducted the strip search to humiliate the
defendant into confessing against his will. While in certain circumstances a strip
search may be reasonable and indeed necessary, this court cannot countenance such
a procedure when its sole purpose is to break down resistance by humiliating and
personally degrading an individual in police custody.
Id.

94

MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES,
STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 473 (2003).
95 While the courts generally have held that a confession is involuntary if it was in
fact induced by such a threat or promise concerning the arrest, release, or custody of a
relative or close friend, the courts have not always been in agreement as to what
constitutes such a threat or promise, and in many cases the facts themselves are sharply
disputed. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Proofof Facts § 5, at 556 (2004).
96 Id. § 4. Confessions required by the explicit conditions of the plea bargain are
inadmissible. Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 (1976).
97 22 AM. JuR. 2D Proofof Facts § 4, at 555 (2004).
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must be read his "rights" before interrogation. 98 These "Miranda rights"
include the right to remain silent, the warning that anything said can and will
be used against the individual in court, the right to have counsel present
before interrogation and at the interrogation, and the right to have counsel
appointed if the person is indigent. 99 Today, a confession generally will be
inadmissible in a prosecutor's case-in-chief if the police have either failed to
inform a defendant of her rights or failed to get a waiver of those rights. No
use may be made at trial of a coerced confession.10 0 Other uses of a coerced
confession could result in claims by the victim of coercion that her
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated.
Another context in which national law enforcement agents interrogate
occurs in the questioning of witnesses. Sometimes witnesses are
uncooperative. The common law has long embraced a device to secure the
cooperation of such witnesses through material witness detention: "A
material witness is an individual who has unique information about a crime,
beneficial to defense or prosecution. The United States has a history of
authorizing and sanctioning the custodial detention of such witnesses to
10 1 The
ensure their appearance and testimony at relevant court proceedings."
detention of the witness is clearly a form of pressure to get cooperation, but it
is not considered unlawful coercion.10 2 Still, it is understood that detention

98 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966):
We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody
interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently
compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to
compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.
Id.If a suspect does not understand English, the suspect must receive the warnings in his
own language. See State v. Santiago, 556 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Wis. 1996).
99 Miranda,384 U.S. at 469-73.
100 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433, n.20 (1984) ("[C]ases in which a
defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was
'compelled' despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates
of Miranda are rare."); 22 AM. JuR. 2D ProofofFacts § 1, at 546-47 (2004).
101 Stacey M. Studnicki & John P. Apol, Witness Detention and Intimidation: The
History and Future of Material Witness Law, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 483, 485 (2002).
102 Waldron argues that
penalties for contempt and perjury are coercive: they impose unwelcome costs on
certain options otherwise available to the witness. Even so, there is a difference of
quality, not just a difference of degree, between the coercion posed by legally
established penalties for non-compliance and the sort of force that involves using
pain to twist the agency and break the will of the person being interrogated.
Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House 23-24
(Nov. 4, 2004), http://www.columbia.edu/cu/law/fed-soc/otherfiles/waldron.pdf (citing
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should happen only rarely. 10 3 Unlawful coercion of a material witness may
result in exclusion of the witness's testimony. Examples include actual and
threatened physical violence. Such coerced confessions are also excluded
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 104
Thus, international law, which generally includes these domestic law
protections, provides broad substantive rights to interrogees in peacetime
from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Important to the enjoyment of
these protections, international law does not recognize excuses or defenses
by interrogators for suspending them. Israel's High Court of Justice in a 1999
case ruled that "neither the government nor the heads of the security services
[have] the authority to establish directives.., regarding the use
of... physical means during the interrogation of suspects suspected of
hostile terrorist activities .
"105 Unfortunately, the court left a loophole
Bradley Graham, Abuse Probes' Impact Concerns the Military; Chilling Effect on
OperationsIs Cited, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2004, at A20). Waldron also writes that "law
can be forceful without compromising the dignity of those it constrains and punishes." Id.
at 50.
103 Studnicki & Apol, supra note 101, at 485. The right to detain material witnesses
has been abused since September 11, 2001:
[The material witness law] was never conceived ... as a means to detain those
whom the authorities suspected of being a threat to society but did not have enough
evidence to charge .... With the War on Terrorism, the legal seas have changed.
The designation of material witness has often become a temporary moniker to
identify an individual who will soon bear the status of defendant.
Laurie L. Levenson, Detention, Material Witnesses & the War on Terrorism, 35 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1222-23 (2002); see also Studnicki & Apol, supra note 101, at 48586:
The detention of material witnesses should be a seldom-used procedure. Recent
events, however, particularly the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States, have brought material witness laws to the forefront as the government seeks
to use the laws as investigatory tools to detain individuals while determining
whether a crime has been committed by the detainee or perhaps by an acquaintance
of the detainee. Such 'investigatory detentions' are not only a misuse of the material
witness laws, but also troubling and potentially unconstitutional.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
104 Studnicki & Apol, supra note 101, at 529.
105 HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel, 38
I.L.M. 1471, 1488 (1999); see also Ardi Imseis, "Moderate" Torture on Trial.: Critical
Reflections on the Israeli Supreme Court Judgment Concerning the Legality of General
Security Service Interrogation Methods, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 328 (2001); Melissa
Clark, Israel's High Court of Justice Ruling on the General Security Service Use of
"ModeratePhysical Pressure". An End to the Sanctioned Use of Torture?, 11 IND. INT'L
& Comp. L. REv. 145 (2000). For more on the situation in Israel before the High Court
decision, see John Quigley, InternationalLimits on Use of Force to Elicit Confessions: A
Critiqueof Israel'sPolicy on Interrogation, 14 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 485 (1988).
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through which the prohibition could be swallowed. It decided that even
though necessity could not be used as authority to permit physical coercion
in interrogation, necessity could be invoked as a defense by an interrogator
who is accused of using coercion. 10 6 The U.N. Human Rights Committee
commented with respect to this aspect10 7of the Israeli case that necessity
cannot be a defense to the use of torture.
The Convention Against Torture also disallows necessity and other
excuses as defenses to torture. Article 2(2) provides: "No exceptional
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or threat of war, internal
political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a
justification of torture." 10 8 It does not specifically disallow necessity for
lesser violations of the Convention, that is, for cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment. The International Civil and Political Rights Covenant, however, in
providing for derogations during emergencies, prohibits derogation from
Article 7 as a whole. In addition, the Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe affirmed in July 2002 that "[t]he use of torture or of inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment is absolutely prohibited, in all
circumstances, and in particular during the arrest, questioning and detention
of a person suspected of ... terrorist activities, irrespective of the nature of
the acts that the person is suspected of .... "109 Thus, torture, cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment are all considered non-derogable
1 10
prohibitions even in times of national emergency.

106 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel, 38

I.L.M. at 1488.

107 "The committee is concerned that interrogation techniques incompatible with

article 7 of the Covenant are still reported frequently to be resorted to and the 'necessity
defence' [sic] argument, which is not recognized under the Covenant, is often invoked
and retained as a justification for ISA actions in the course of investigations." Hum. Rts.
Comm., Concluding Observationsof the Human Rights Committee: Israel, para. 18, U.N.
GAOR 78th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 21, 2003).
See also Paola Gaeta, May Necessity Be Available as a Defence for Torture in the
Interrogation of Suspected Terrorists?, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 785 (2004). The author
concludes that necessity is not a defense, in part because torture is never "necessary," it
being an unreliable and time-consuming form of information-gathering.
108 Convention Against Torture, supra note 68, art. 2.
109 Waldron, supra note 102, at 7 n. 17 (quoting Sanford Levinson,
"Precommitment" and "Postcommitment": The Ban on Torture in the Wake of
September 11, 81 TEX. L. REv. 2013, 2016 (2003)).
110 ICCPR, supra note 65, art. 4. See also ECPHR, supra note 67, art. 15; The
Republic of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1978) (prohibition on
inhuman and degrading treatment applied during a time of emergency caused by IRA
terrorism).
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III. IGNORE THE BANS?

This is the law governing interrogation, and it is likely to remain the law.
Even the Bush Administration has made no move to request any formal
change in IHL, the Convention Against Torture, or the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights. 111 None of the other parties to
these treaties shows any willingness to effectuate change. Nevertheless, a
few in the United States have called for our country to ignore the law. They
argue that it is effective to torture and coerce during interrogation and that
effectiveness justifies law violation in a war on terror. The next section
examines these claims. At the end of the section, we consider briefly the
erroneous notion that international law cannot be enforced and therefore need
not be taken seriously. This misconception has also been part of the
discussion around coercive interrogation and will be clarified here.
A. UnjustifiedLaw Violations
It should be completely irrelevant to Americans that coercive
interrogation can result in useful information. The practice is unlawful and
we are a nation under law that does not engage in unlawful -practices as a
matter of official policy. Even if the practice was not unlawful, it is immoral,
and for that reason we must reject it regardless of any arguments of
effectiveness. 112 To torture, coerce, or abuse someone in custody is an affront
to human dignity; it offends any moral code. As Israel's High Court said in
its decision prohibiting the use of physical coercion during interrogation of
suspected terrorists:
This is the destiny of democracy, as not all means are acceptable to it, and
not all practices employed by its enemies are open before it. Although a
democracy must often fight with one hand tied behind its back, it
nonetheless has the upper hand. Preserving the Rule of Law and recognition
of an individual's liberty constitutes an important component in its

has, however, refused to become a party to the CAT protocol allowing surprise
prison inspections as a measure to deter torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment. Indeed, the United States tried to prevent the protocol from being adopted. See
Barbara Crossette, U.S. Fails in Effort to Block Vote on UN. Convention on Torture,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 25, 2002, at A7.
112 Waldron, supra note 102, at 81.
1It
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understanding of security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its spirit
113
and its strength and allow it to overcome its difficulties.
There is only one phrase of this eloquent statement about which more
needs to be said. The High Court assumes that relinquishing coercive
interrogation techniques means giving up some advantage in the struggle
against terrorism. This is a false assumption. The evidence indicates that
societies that respect legal rights and human dignity, even of the most
heinous criminals, have greater success in repressing crime than those that do
not. 1 4 Refusing to coerce detainees is not fighting with "one hand tied
behind its back." On the contrary, the weight of the evidence shows that
trained and skillful interrogators do not need to use coercion.1 15 The use of
coercion and the violation of other important human rights have been
counter-productive in struggles against terrorism.
Two popular writers, Mark Bowden and Alan Dershowitz, have called
for the use of coercion and even torture by the United States in the
interrogation of terrorist suspects. They both believe forceful interrogation is
an effective means of information-gathering. 1 16 Both authors, however, rely
on anecdotes to support their arguments. Most of the anecdotes that actually
condone coercion come from Israeli interrogators, men who have used
torture and coercion, and, therefore, have a vested interest in presenting the
use of such measures as successful. Their claims must be discounted.
Bowden also provides anecdotes from the United States and Germany.
Far from supporting coercion, these anecdotes lead us to conclude that noncoercive interrogation is amply effective. Bowden's American story concerns
a New York City Police Detective named Jerry Giorgio. Giorgio, according
to Bowden, is a masterful interrogator. But, in describing Giorgio's success,
Bowden never mentions that he uses coercion. On the contrary, Giorgio does
not even play "good cop/bad cop" in interrogation, because he never needs a
"bad cop." The secret to getting information is getting a good interrogator
and a good interrogator is someone people will talk to:

113

HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel, 38

I.L.M. 1471, 1488 (1999).
114 See infra notes 126-35 and accompanying text. The wartime situation has an
analog to this observation on peacetime protections. Since the time of Augustine in the
Fifth Century, commentators on IHL have observed that those armies respecting the

rights of their enemy have a greater chance to secure the peace following victory on the
battlefield. See O'CONNELL, supra note 26, at 153.
115 See infra notes 126-35 and accompanying text.
1 16
See Bowden, supra note 8, at 76; ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS,
UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE

138 (2002).
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You want a good interrogator?... Give me somebody who people like, and
who likes people. Give me somebody who knows how to talk to put people
at ease. Because the more comfortable they are, the more they talk, and the
more they talk, the more trouble they're in-the harder it is to sustain a
1
lie. 17
Who likes to talk to someone who is sticking needles under his
fingernails? 118 Indeed, as will be discussed below, the use of force during
interrogation is counter-productive to the intelligence-gathering effort, since
1 19
once abused, a person will not cooperate.
Bowden's example from Germany equally fails to support coercion. A
deputy police chief threatened a suspect with torture to get the suspect to take
him to where a kidnapped boy was hidden. The suspect went to the place, but
the boy was dead. This tragic outcome must disqualify this example as one of
successful coercive interrogation. The policeman was prosecuted for his
20
unlawful action, found guilty, and lost his job.1
Dershowitz also relies heavily on the case of Abdul Hakim Murad for his
conclusion that torture works. Dershowitz says Murad was tortured in the
Philippines for sixty-seven days at which point he "may" have revealed
information about various al Qaeda plots.' 2 1 Writers referring to the case,
however, have raised doubts as to whether Murad was actually tortured and
122
whether anything he told the Philippine authorities was actually true.
Further, professional interrogators dismiss out of hand the claim that after

117 Bowden, supra note 8, at 58. Bowden also spends several pages of his article
reviewing experiments from the 1960s aimed at finding effective means of coercive and
torturous interrogation. He notes that in all cases the experiments proved inconclusive.
"One thing all these experiments made clear was that no matter what drugs or methods
were applied, the results varied from person to person." Id. at 58. Several of his anecdotes
bear this out. Yet he concludes that "[i]t is wise of the President to reiterate U.S. support
for international agreements banning torture, and it is wise for American interrogators to
employ whatever coercive methods work." Id. at 76.
118 This is one of the techniques recommended by Alan Dershowitz. DERSHOWITZ,
supranote 116, at 148.
119 See infra notes 126-38 and accompanying text.
120 Bowden, supra note 8, at 70.
121 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 116, at 137.
122 See Jonathan F. Lenzer, From a Pakistani Stationhouse to the Federal
Courthouse: A Confession's Uncertain Journey in the U.S.-Led War on Terror, 12
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. 297, 314 (2004); Andrew A. Moher, The Lesser of Two
Evils? An Argument for Judicially Sanctioned Torture in a Post 9/11 World, 26 T.
JEFFERSON L. REv. 469, 480-81 (2004) ("[T]he veracity of Murad's confessions has
).
recently come into dispute ....
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sixty-seven days anything Murad might have told authorities could have been
of any real value in preventing plots.
A case involving a U.S. Army Colonel in Iraq, which occurred after
Bowden and Dershowitz wrote, has received considerable attention to the
point that it has become an urban legend. The actual facts provide no support
for the effectiveness of coercive interrogation: in April 2003, north of
Baghdad, Colonel Allen B. West, on a tip from an informant, ordered his
men to beat a detainee for information. 12 3 When the detainee would say
nothing, West fired his revolver at him twice, near the man's head, the
second time after counting down. Following the second mock execution, the
man began to provide all kinds of details-names, dates, etc. "[H]e was not
sure what he told the Americans, but that it was meaningless information
induced by fear and pain."' 124 No evidence of a plot was ever found; no one
was arrested. The detainee was released after forty-five days without charge.
Colonel West was fined and dismissed from the service. He was not court25

martialed. 1

This story illustrates the usual result of coercive interrogation-saying
anything to get the pain and fear to stop. Based on this fact, long-held United
States Army and FBI policies have rejected coercive interrogation as
unlawful, immoral, and unreliable. The 1987 United States Army
Interrogation Field Manual 34-52 includes the following statement:
The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to
unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited by law and is
neither authorized nor condoned by the US [sic] Government. Experience
indicates that the use of force is not necessary to gain the cooperation of
sources for interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique, as
it yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and
can induce the source to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to
hear. However, the use of force is not to be confused with psychological
ploys, verbal trickery, or other nonviolent and noncoercive ruses used by
126
the interrogator in questioning hesitant or uncooperative sources.

123 Deborah Sontag, How U.S. Officer's Risk in Iraq Backfired, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., May 28, 2004, at 2.
124 Id
125 He was cheered at a luncheon talk a few short weeks after the national broadcast
of the abuse pictures from Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Lona O'Connor, Army Officer Who
ThreatenedPrisonerAddresses Luncheon, PALM BEACH POST, May 28, 2004, at 5C.
126 U.S. Army, Intelligence Interrogation Field Manual 34-52, 1-1 (May 8, 1987).
The United States Army is preparing a new interrogation field manual that reportedly will
expressly prohibit harsh techniques. See Eric Schmitt, Army, in Manual Limiting Tactics
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Similarly, FBI agents prefer "the bureau's long-accepted, court-approved
interrogation policy of building rapport with detainees to obtain information
about terrorism." 127 In a serious academic study of the effectiveness of
coercion in interrogation, Darius Rejali concluded that "there is no empirical
evidence to suggest that [torture] works, at least in the way that people claim
that it does in the war against terrorism .... -128
Rejali's conclusion is confirmed by Douglas Johnson, Executive Director
for the Center of Victims of Torture. The Center has provided care to over
7500 victims of torture from sixty countries. In testimony before Congress,
Johnson said:
The assumption behind the [torture] memoranda... is that some form
of physical and mental coercion is necessary to get information to protect
the American people from terrorism. These are unproven assumptions based
on anecdotes from agencies with little transparency, but they have been
popularized in the American media by endless repetition of what is called
the ticking time bomb scenario. Based on our experience at the center with
torture survivors and understanding the systems in which they have been
abused, we believe it is important that these discussions [about
interrogation] not be shaped by speculation but rather through an
understanding of how torture is actually used in the world. From our
understanding, we have derived eight broad lessons. And those are:
First of all, torture does not yield reliable information.
Secondly, torture does not yield information quickly.
Third, torture has a corrupting effect on the perpetrator.
Fourth, torture will not be used only against the guilty.
In fact, fifth, torture has never been confined to narrow conditions;
once it's used, it broadens;
Psychological torture results in long-term damage.
Stress and duress techniques are forms of torture.

in Interrogation,Seeking to Avoid Abuses, Harsh Techniques Used at Abu Ghraib Will
Be Expressly Banned, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2005, at Al.
127 Toni Locy & Kevin Johnson, FBI Had Warned Pentagon on Tactics, USA
Dec. 8, 2004, at IA; Email (parties redacted) Re: GTMO-Related Emails, Notes
Etc. (May 10, 2004), http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/FBI_4142.pdf (indicating
concern about Department of Defense interrogation practices and the FBI position
recommending "rapport based" interrogation).
128 Michael Slackman, The World: A Dangerous Calculus; What's Wrong with
Torturing a Qaeda Higher-Up?, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2004, at D4; see also DARIUS
TODAY,

REJALI, TORTURE & MODERNITY: SELF, SOCIETY AND STATE IN MODERN IRAN (1994).
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And finally, number eight, we cannot torture and still retain the moral
29
high ground. 1
Highly trained and experienced United States Army interrogators
confirm Johnson's conclusions. Indeed, they go further to say that the use of
coercion and abuse is counter-productive to intelligence-gathering. Its use by
the United States since 9/11 has likely cost this country lives:
Such behavior not only causes needless suffering for the victim and is
criminal, it jeopardizes the intelligence collection effort. Once a prisoner
has been abused, gaining his or her willing cooperation is often impossible,
even for a highly-skilled interrogator. In addition, any information gained
during such an interrogation cannot be regarded as dependable or
reliable. 130
The Administration has claimed that it has gotten useful information
using coercive and abusive tactics at Guantanamo. However, one of the FBI
e-mails from Guantanamo Bay, released in December 2004 states: "These

129 Confirmation Hearingon the Nomination of Alberto R. Gonzales to be Attorney
Generalof the United States before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1 (2005)
(testimony of Douglas Johnson). For similar conclusions, see also Merle L. Pribbenow,

The Man in the Snow White Cell, 48 STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE 59 (2004).
130 Declaration of Peter Bauer Filed in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary

Injunction Against CACI International, para. 9, Saleh v. Titan, Case No. 04 CV 1143 R
(NLS) (S.D. Cal. 2004); see also Declaration of Marney Mason Filed in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction Against CACI International, Saleh v. Titan,
Case No. 04 CV 1143 R (NLS) (S.D. Cal. 2004) (the two declarants have eleven and
eighteen years of experience as Army interrogators respectively). For the similar views of
experienced FBI agents, see Jason Vest, Pray and Tell, AM. PROSPECT, July 2004, at 47.
Apparently military lawyers also objected to the Administration's departure from longtime policy and codified law. Vanessa Blum, Early Warning: Military Lawyers Fought
Justice Department,Argued Interrogation Techniques Would Backfire, BROWARD DAILY
Bus. REV., Aug. 3, 2005, at 10; Neil A. Lewis, Military's Opposition to Harsh
Interrogationis Outlined,N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2005, at A21.
The Israeli High Court based its allowance of the necessity defense for some cases of
coercion on the basis of the infamous "ticking time bomb" hypothetical. HCJ 5100/94
Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel, 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1485-86
(1999). Plainly, if torture and coercion are unreliable, the last time you would want to use
them are in situations where time is of the essence. Therefore no more need be said here
on the ticking time bomb. But, for a discussion of the unrealistic nature of both the
ticking time bomb scenario and the ability to restrict torture to very limited situations, see
Waldron, supra note 102, at 38-39 (citing Henry Shue, Torture, in 7 PHILOSOPHY AND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 124, 141-42 (1978)).
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tactics have produced no intelligence of a threat neutralization nature to
date."131
Finally, societies known to use torture, coercion, and abuse have not
resolved their problems of terrorism. Societies that have abandoned such
practices or never used them in the first place have had greater success.
Northern Ireland is a telling example. In the early years of the "troubles" in
Northern Ireland, the British government adopted emergency powers that led
to the coercive and abusive treatment of terrorism suspects:
The mistreatment of suspects while in custody under emergency
powers included use of methods that have been condemned by courts
worldwide. These include intensive interrogations for extended periods,
sleep deprivation, hooding of suspects, the use of white noise, forcing
suspects to stand or kneel in uncomfortable positions for extended periods
of time, threats and beatings of suspects, and standing on the backs of
suspects' legs, among others. Even govemment commissions, while
attempting to minimize the allegations, have acknowledged32 that the
government adopted abusive interrogations practices as a policy.1
While the emergency powers were in place and these abuses were being
committed, "[t]he Commander of the IRA in the Maze Prison, Jim McVeigh,
called the emergency provisions 'the best recruiting tools the IRA ever
had.'"133 Academics studying the case reach the same conclusion:
Kieman McEvoy, of Queens University-Belfast, who has studied the
use of emergency legislation in Northern Ireland, has identified spikes in

131 Spencer Ackerman, Island Mentality: Why the Bush Administration Defends
Guantanamo, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 22, 2005, at 17. Cf Press Release, Dep't of
Defense, Guantanamo Provides Valuable Intelligence Information, No. 592-05 (June 12,
2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr20050612-3661.html.
Moreover, coercive tactics have resulted in deaths-hardly an outcome likely to aid
information-gathering. Suspects have died, for example, in the course of coercive Israeli
interrogations. See Amos N. Guiora, The Unholy Trinity: Intelligence, Interrogationand
Torture 11 (Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Working Paper 05-13, July
2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=758444. A number of people are known to
have died as a result of coercive tactics by U.S. interrogators in Afghanistan. See, e.g.,
Tim Golden, Low Ranks Feel Swift US. Justice; Afghan Abuse Raises Questions of
Officers, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 9, 2005, at 7; Jeffrey Smith, InterrogatorSays US.
Approved Handlingof Detainee Who Died, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2005, A07.
132 Michael P. O'Connor & Celia M. Rumann, Into the Fire: How to Avoid Getting
Burned by the Same Mistakes Made Fighting Terrorism in Northern Ireland, 24
CARDozo L. REv. 1657, 1683-84 (2003); see also The Republic of Ireland v. The United
Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1978).
133 O'Connor & Rumann, supra note 132, at 1702.
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violence surrounding the use of emergency powers to target the Catholic
Republican community. Initially, some of the measures used had the effect
of suppressing violence. But the manner in which the powers were useddisproportionately against the Republican community and with unchecked
134
aggression by security forces-led to explosions in violence.

Britain ended the use of coercive interrogation techniques 135 after the
decision in the case before the European Court of Human Rights, discussed
above. Subsequently, Britain reached a peace accord with Republican parties
and the use of violence and support of the IRA has waned substantially.
Germany and Italy provide even stronger examples of states that eliminated
serious terrorism challenges, from the Red Army Faction and the Red
Brigades in their respective countries, while remaining committed to
requirements of international human rights principles.
Israel is a counter-example. Still understood to permit coercive
interrogation methods through the necessity-defense loophole 136 and after
decades when use of coercion was directly lawful and very widely used, it
remains the target of unending terrorist attacks. According to Bowden, twothirds of all Palestinian suspects in Israeli custody have been subjected to
torture or coercion in Israeli detention. 137 Today no one suggests that Israel is
resolving its terrorism problem in the way that the British, Germans, or
138
Italians have done.

134 Id.
135 Id. at 1684.
136 This was the finding of the Human Rights Committee in 2003. See Hum. Rts.
Comm., Concluding Observationsof the Human Rights Committee: Israel, para. 18, U.N.
GAOR 78th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 21, 2003). Bowden cites an Israeli
human rights activist who confirms that torture did not end after the 1999 Public
Committee decision. Bowden, supra note 8, at 76.
137 Bowden, supra note 8, at 76.
138 Early indications from the Iraq conflict are consistent with these observations.
We know that when the media began reporting on U.S. use of torture and coercion of
detainees in Iraq, insurgent groups cited the abuse as a reason for their own acts of
violence. In May 2005, anti-American rioting broke out in four countries resulting in the
deaths of as many as seventeen people. The anger was triggered by a Newsweek story that
interrogators at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, had flushed a Koran down a toilet. Newsweek
formally "retracted" the story when the magazine's sole anonymous source refused to
confirm it following publication-and following the rioting. The story had been credible
to Newsweek given the considerable evidence that the United States has used unlawful
interrogation methods, including some that exploit an interogee's Muslim faith. Around
the Muslim world, the Bush Administration's denial of this one incident was little
believed, again owing to the widespread knowledge that unlawful techniques have been
used against Muslims. See Katharine Q. Seelye & Neil A. Lewis, Newsweek Says It Is
Retracting Koran Report, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2005, at Al. The Administration
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B. Enforcement of International Law
Bowden asserts in his article that international law is unenforceable, and
he implies that it may therefore be ignored. 139 This observation is factually
incorrect and ignorant of the nature of law. The binding nature of law-all
law-is not assessed based on the number of enforcement actions brought in
response to law violations. 140 Nevertheless, international law does have
means of enforcement and those means are generally similar to the means
available in national legal systems. The primary difference is that
international society does not have a dedicated police force at its disposal.
Rather, states use their own police forces to enforce international law,
unilaterally or collectively, and occasionally specialized forces are organized
for particular purposes. States and international organizations also enforce
international law through military force, sanctions of all kinds, and through
international and national courts.
International law of the type discussed in this Article concerns the legal
duty of nation-states to exercise due diligence in ensuring that their personnel
use only lawful methods of interrogation. Where a state fails in this duty,
other states can hale them before international courts and tribunals, such as
the case brought by Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands against
Greece for peacetime torture, the case brought by Ireland against Britain for
peacetime cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, and Ethiopia's case
against Eritrea for wartime torture and coercion. 14 1 States can be scrutinized
and called into compliance by human rights monitoring bodies, as the United
States has been by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

promised to respect the holy Koran, but failed to commit to full compliance with
international law respecting interrogation, including full access to detainees by the ICRC.
In this author's view, it will only be when such a promise is made-and kept-that the
United States will begin to regain a modicum of respect in the Muslim world.
Compliance with international law following September 11 would have saved us from
this current costly and shameful situation.
139 Bowden, supra note 8, at 56.
140 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). For discussions of the
nature of international law and why nations obey, see Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS
BEHAVE (2d ed. 1979); see also, Harold Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?,
106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997).
141 See supra notes 63, 71-82 and accompanying text.
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regarding Guantanamo Bay. 142 They may be subjected to sanctions-a
43
choice that the United States has particularly advocated over the years. 1
In addition, where a state fails to enforce international law against its
own citizens, other states are increasingly stepping in to hold individuals
accountable. The Geneva Conventions, as discussed above, mandate that
those guilty of grave breaches be held accountable before the courts of any of
the 190 parties. 144 An Italian prosecutor issued indictments for nineteen CIA
officers in the summer of 2005, charging that they kidnapped a Muslim cleric
and took him to Egypt where he says he was tortured. 145 A number of states
will prosecute international crimes, such as torture, regardless of the
nationality of the suspect, victim, or place of the crime. Criminal complaints
under such laws have been filed by citizens in Chile and Germany against
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, former CIA Director George Tenet,
and others for the abuse of detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay,

142 Precautionary Measures in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Mar. 13,
at
available
2002),
cited in Diane
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/guantanamomeasures2002.html,
Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42 COL. J. TRANS. L. 263, 276 n.48 (2004).
143 For a review of major sanctions programs instituted by the Security Council to
respond to human rights violations and other breaches of international law, see Mary
Ellen O'Connell, Debating the Law of Sanctions, 13 EuR. J. INT'L L. 63 (2002).
144 See Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. T, Eur. High Ct. 3d Div. 1994 (Den.) excerpted
in O'CONNELL, supra note 26, at 558 (the Danish prosecuted a Croatian in Denmark on
an asylum visa for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions in the beating of POWs in
Bosnia). See also Neil A. Lewis, Military's Opposition to Harsh Interrogation is
Outlined, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2005, at A21 for the views of top U.S. military lawyers
that persons using unlawful techniques could face prosecution in various courts:

General Rives added that many other countries were likely to disagree with the
reasoning used by Justice Department lawyers about immunity from
prosecution. Instead, he said, the use of many of the interrogation techniques
"puts the interrogators and the chain of command at risk of criminal accusations
abroad." Any such crimes, he said, could be prosecuted in other nations' courts,
international courts, or the International Criminal Court, a body the United
States does not formally participate in or recognize.
Id
145 Ian Cobain, CIA Terror Flights: Destination Cairo: Human Rights Fears Over
CIA Flights: Snatched Suspects Tell of Torture: UN Investigatorto Look at British Role,
GUARDIAN, Sept. 12, 2005, at 13. Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Austria have
launched official investigations or taken other measures in response to use of their
airspace by the CIA for rendition of persons to places where they may face torture. See
id; see also Germany Investigates Alleged CIA Abductions, COLS. DISPATCH, July 22,
2005, at A 1l.
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and at undisclosed locations. 146 Furthermore, civil actions may be brought for
compensation when rights are violated. Two such actions have already been
filed in the United States by victims of torture and abuse at the hands of
Americans. 147 More legal action can be expected, given the position taken in
many countries that their courts have jurisdiction over torture, coercion,
cruelty, and abuse during interrogation in war and peace. 148
IV. CONCLUSION

Whether a combatant or a civilian criminal suspect, those detained by the
United States in its so-called war on terror have certain inalienable rights.
Likewise, the United States government, its military and agencies, and those
working under its control have specific legal obligations that form a
framework within which individuals can be detained. Neither wishful legal
analysis nor creative classification of detainees relieves the government of its
responsibilities. While there is no treaty, law, or regulation prohibiting the
interrogation of prisoners and detainees, such interrogation must be carried
out in a manner consistent with law, both domestic and international. Anyone
authorizing, supervising, or conducting interrogations in which illegal
techniques are used should be held accountable in accord with the
international ban on coercive interrogation. In complying with the law, the
United States will find its best chance of triumphing over terrorism not in the

146 For details regarding the complaints filed in Germany, see the website of the
Center for Constitutional Rights, Docket: Center For Constitutional Rights Seeks

Criminal Investigation in Germany into Culpability of U.S. Officials in Abu Ghraib
Torture,
http://www.ccrny.org/v2flegal/september1 th/septi1Article.asp?ObjID=1xiADJOOQx&Content-=472
(last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
147 Human Rights First and the American Civil Liberties Union have brought a civil
suit on behalf of victims of torture against Donald Rumsfeld, George Tenet and others.
See Michael Posner Executive Director, Human Rights First, The Case Against Rumsfeld
(Mar. 1, 2005), http://www.humanrightsfust.org/uslaw/etn/lawsuit/statements/litposner-030105.htm. The Center for Constitutional Rights and human rights lawyers have
brought a RICO action on behalf of victims of torture against two private contracting
firms that supplied interpreters and contractors to the U.S. government. See Center for
Constitutional Rights, CCR Files Lawsuit Against Private Contractors for Torture
Conspiracy,
http://www.ccrny.org/v2/reports/report.asp?ObjID=cBct36Qkps&Content=401

(last visited Nov. 22,

2005).
148 For a discussion of jurisdiction over the crime of torture, see James Thuo Gathii,
Torture, Extraterritoriality, Terrorism and International Law, 67 ALBANY L.R. 335

(2003).
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narrow sense of stopping every attack, but in the larger sense of remaining a
society worth defending from terrorism.

